This paper examines patterns of compliance and noncompliance with federal minimum wage laws in the U.S. apparel industry and analyzes the impact of new methods of intervention designed to improve regulatory performance. Drawing on contractor-level data from a randomized survey of apparel contractors, the paper assesses the major correlates of compliance with minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
© David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 4 of Stigler 1970) show that a profit maximizing firm selling output at price p and able to obtain workers L at a wage rate w and other factors of production at price r will decide whether to comply with the minimum wage by balancing the expected costs of complying with the law and paying the mandated wage (M) against the expected cost of non-compliance. The latter reflects the probability of being caught (_) and incurring a penalty (D) against the chance of not being caught and paying wages below the mandated minimum wage (w). Ashenfelter and Smith show that an employer will choose noncompliance in the case that:
In (1), the employer balances the expected profit from not complying (E(_)) against the profit known with certainty if the firm chooses to comply with the standard ( _(M,r,p)).
Equation (1) predicts that noncompliance will rise with the divergence between the mandated wage and the market wage and fall with either increased probability of detection or higher penalty levels. Grenier (1982) modifies the Ashenfelter and Smith analysis by noting that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the government does not levy penalties for first time violators, nor typically assess high penalties for repeat offenders. Instead, the Wage and Hour Division (the arm of the U.S. Department of Labor with authority for enforcing FLSA) requires offending employers to pay back wages to employees who have been underpaid during the period of time covered by the inspection (that is an amount equal to
M-w).
Grenier points out that since the typical "penalty" facing a firm is a fraction of the underpayment in wages, the penalty effect is far less than implied by the Ashenfelter and
Smith model (which assumed a lump sum penalty of "D"). However, because the penalty © David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 5 in this case will vary with the number of workers hired by the non-complying firm ((Mw)*L), the penalty is endogenous and the optimal compliance decision will reflect the trade-off in hiring more workers at the lower market wage and potentially facing a higher penalty if caught at the end of the period. Chang and Erlich (1985) create a more general model that attempts to correct aspects of both of the earlier papers. For our purposes, the salient modification entails endogenizing the labor demand with respect to the prospective legal sanction facing the non-complying firm. Specifically, the authors make the penalty grow with the degree to which the actual total wages paid by the contractor are lower than the mandated wages for that workforce. This modification in the model (which brings it closer to the actual penalty policy pursued by WHD) leads them to show that a "minimum wage enforcement policy requiring the violating firm to pay only a fraction of the difference between the statutory minimum and the market wage per unit labor will not constitute an effective deterrent." (p. 87). They also show that regardless of the penalty policy chosen (lump sum or proportional to back wage owed), the incentives for noncompliance grow as the market wage becomes lower than the statutory minimum.
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From an empirical point of view, the literature on minimum wage compliance implies that the incentives for non-compliance in general should grow with:
• Correlates that would lead the market wage to be substantially below the statutory wage (M-w>0) such as low skill requirements for the required labor;
3 Although the deterrence effect of the minimum wage is muted from these effects implying that minimum wage effects on employment will be more moderate than implied by a downward sloping labor demand,
• Employer business characteristics that lower the probability of detection of noncompliance (λ), such as high levels of industry exit and entry; small average establishment size; and an ability to evade public scrutiny by operating in the underground economy;
• Increases in the elasticity of product demand, as measured by a company's ability to affect prices and differentiate products;
• Increases in the elasticity of labor demand, as measured by factors such as skill content, capital intensity, and other Marshallian factors of derived labor demand.
B. Apparel industry dynamics
Product and labor markets: Product and labor markets in the apparel industry have many of the features that would suggest high rates of noncompliance. In particular, the women's segment of the industry has been characterized by a more splintered production system where different enterprises carry out the design, cutting, and sewing and pressing / packaging of apparel products. 4 For example, a "jobber" may sell a design to retailer, and then contract with a manufacturer for delivery of the product. The manufacturer, in turn, may purchase and cut the product, but then contract out sewing to one or more companies (which may, in turn further contract out sub-assembly).
Contractors compete to preassemble bundles of cut garment pieces in a market where there is little ability to differential services (i.e. sewing and associated assembly) except Yaniv (2001) shows that reducing the number of workers employed arising from compliance decisions is complementary to the decision by employers to evade minimum wage by underpaying workers. 4 In the U.S., men's clothing--from the 1920s onward-is primarily produced in factory-type settings, with manufacturers designing, cutting, sewing, pressing, and packaging products.
© David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 7 for some operations requiring higher levels of skill content. The structure of relations from the retailer down to contractors and subcontractors is depicted in Figure 1 .
In general, as one goes to "lower" levels of apparel production (that is from design and cutting by manufacturer or jobbers at the top of Figure 1 , to sewing by contractors or subcontractor at the bottom) the level of competition intensifies and profit margin per garment diminishes. Sewing contractors-often themselves recent immigrants to the U.S.-compete in a market with large numbers of small companies (on average 25-35 workers in the women's industry), low barriers to entry, and limited opportunities for product differentiation. This creates classic conditions for intense price-based competition. Because labor costs represent the vast majority of total costs for a sewing contractor, the pressure to strike deals with jobbers and manufacturers that are not economically sustainable if the contractor complied with wage and hour laws is high.
Labor market conditions also tend to push wages towards the legal minimum or below. In the women's segment, many entry level sewers can reach the standard rate for sewing in a matter of months, making it relatively easy to substitute workers in the event of turnover (Abernathy et. al. 1999) . The apparel industry and sewing has always been attractive to immigrants given its low skill barriers (e.g. Slovaks, Germans, and Jews at turn of century; Hispanic, Chinese and Asian workers today).
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The consequent elastic supply of workers and the relatively low skill level demands for them keep wage levels low and the incentive to work long hours--even in inhospitable work environments--high.
The illegal status of many workers, language barriers, and cultural norms further undercut the bargaining power of these workers (Kwong 1997) .
C. The economics of compliance for apparel
Given the market dynamics described above, non-compliance is predominately a problem among the large number of contractors and subcontractors that assemble women's apparel products (see Figure 1) . Regulatory attention has historically been focused at that level of the industry.
6 Table 1 presents characteristics of FLSA enforcement in the apparel industry since 1996 that can be used to assess the economics of compliance for the typical contractor.
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The WHD conducted a total of 3,226 investigations in the garment industry between the final two quarters of 1996 and the fourth quarter of 2000, or about 200
inspections in a typical 3-month period. Although this represents an increase in enforcement effort relative to the prior decade, this inspection activity translates into an annual probability that a given contract shop will receive an inspection (λ) below 0.10.
8
Penalties under FLSA are the civil penalties levied by WHD inspectors based on the scale and severity of non-compliance detected as well as the past history of the contractor. The civil penalties incurred by a typical contractor (D) were $1,086 per contractor (Table 1, column 4).
5 See Commons (1901) Using these figures, we can do a simple simulation for an employer facing the compliance decision for two time periods. In each period, the employer faces the chance of being inspected for the first time of λ t1 =0.1. If a contractor is inspected in the first period and is found in violation of minimum wage, we assume that the chance of an inspection in the second period doubles (λ t2 =0.2). The first time a contractor is caught out of compliance, they are required to pay the back wages to underpaid workers, but no penalty. If caught a second time (and assuming the same average underpayment), the contractor is required to pay back pay plus the average expected civil penalty (D=$1100).
A contractor, given the inspection probabilities, penalty structure, and backpay liability described above therefore faces a very high incentive to underpay workers in both period 1 and period 2. In fact, the incentives for noncompliance are large enough that an employer will choose compliance even if found in violation of minimum wage requirements in the first period and facing a higher inspection probability and civil penalty in the subsequent period.
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The economics of compliance can also be shown by using the decision framework laid out in Ashenfelter and Smith and the data in Table 1 .
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Given the tradeoff between compliance and noncompliance portrayed in (1), Ashenfelter and Smith show that an employer will choose to not pay minimum wage if:
Based on the figures above, the values for the above equation can be roughly estimated for a "typical" apparel contractor with 35 workers as:
• Average annual underpayment per worker ((M-w)) = $338
• Median civil penalty (D) of $1,100
• Average annual likelihood of inspection (_) of .1
• Assuming a relatively high labor demand elasticity (η) of -1.5 employs conservative assumptions, implying that the underlying incentives for noncompliance are even larger.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics

A. Data source
The data for this study arise from surveys of randomly selected apparel contractors in the Southern California (Los Angeles) garment industry. The survey was conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division (WHD) using a randomly selected set of establishments in the Southern California apparel market. The universe for the 2000 random survey was comprised of all apparel industry firms appearing on the California manufacturing registration list for that year.
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Using this comprehensive list of apparel manufacturers and contractors as the sampling universe, the WHD randomly selected establishments representing contractors operating in 2000.
Contractors selected from the list received an "inspection-based survey" by WHD investigators that included a review of all payroll records for the prior 12 week period.
The payroll review is similar to that conducted by WHD in regular inspection activities.
In addition, the investigators collect information on other aspects of the contractors business, including employer size, years of operation, business structure (e.g. corporation 12 Ashenfelter and Smith use this elasticity in applying their model to low wage employers facing the noncompliance decision (p.336). 13 The California registration list for apparel consists of "…all persons or firms engaged in the business of apparel manufacturing…" where apparel manufacturing is defined as "…sewing, cutting, making, processing, repairing, finishing, assembling, or otherwise preparing any garment or any article of wearing apparel or accessories designed or intended to be worn by any individual…" or partnership), and types of products assembled. Information on the number of manufacturers that the contractor worked for over the past 6 months and whether or not those manufacturers had monitoring programs (described below) are also collected (Wage and Hour Division, 2001 ).
14 Because of the high rate of turnover of contractors (almost 50 percent of the sample were in firms that had been in business for less than 2 years), a separate subsample was created to represent contractors that had been previously inspected and found in violation of the Act. A list of all contractors that had been found in FLSA violation in the prior 2 years was assembled and a random sample of these contractors was selected for similar investigation-based surveys, resulting in a total of 30 contractors. Because of the high turnover level in the industry, the group of prior violators is over-sampled as a result of this procedure.
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B. Descriptive statistics
Tables 2a and 2b provide descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole and split out by those contractors that had never received prior inspections and those with prior violations. Table 2a provides information regarding compliance among the contractors. In terms of overall compliance, 45.6% of contractors surveyed were in compliance with minimum wage provisions of the FLSA, with an average of 8 employees per contractor were underpaid in some way. A typical contractor owed about $3700 in back wages for the time period under study. These estimates can be standardized given that contractors in the sample differ in size and that there is some variation in the period of time of payroll review. One standardized measure used throughout this study is the average number of workers that were underpaid per 100 production workers employed.
A second standardized measure is the average back wage owed per week per employee.
These estimates are provided in the final two rows of Table 2a . With respect to these standardized measures of compliance, the differences in levels are not statistically significant differences between contractors that had no prior violations and those with prior violations.
The typical contractor in the sample is small (37 production workers), relatively new (almost half have been in business less than 25 months), managed directly by the owner, and engaged in producing slightly more than one type of product. In most respects, the characteristics of contractors inspected for the first time look similar to those with a prior violation of wage and hour laws, although prior violators have more employees than those that had not been inspected in prior periods.
C. Compliance measures
The measure of performance typically employed in regulatory evaluations is employer compliance with promulgated standards. In the case of minimum wage, a contractor is considered as being out of compliance if one or more employees is found to have been underpaid during the investigation period. The obvious problem with this approach is that it does not delineate between employers who underpaid a small fraction of their workforce from those who underpaid a large proportion. Further, the above definition of employer compliance does not distinguish between cases where employees bear a large burden because of non-compliance (that is experience gross underpayment in wages) from cases where the infractions are minor.
The economics of minimum wage compliance and the impact of government In the following, we measure contractor compliance behavior in terms of overall likelihood of compliance (traditional measure of compliance); the incidence of violation (measured as the number of violation per 100 workers employed); and the severity of violation (measured as the back wage owed per week per worker). Table 3 provides all three measures of compliance, and compares them across contractors with different characteristics.
The overall extent of minimum wage violations is significant across all three measures: employers have more than a 50% likelihood of being in violation of the minimum wage provision; more than 27 of every 100 workers has experienced some degree of underpayment, and the seriousness of violations is equivalent to underpaying every worker on the employer by about $5.00 per week (in an industry where average hourly earnings were approximately $8.00 in 2000). Table 3 also provides evidence consistent with the predictions of the minimum wage literature surveyed above. For example, theory would predict that firms that pay higher wage rates or have less elastic demand for labor--either because of the skill content of the work or of its labor force--would be less likely to violate minimum wage.
One proxy for skill content is the product produced by a firm: T-shirts have very little direct labor (typically less than 4 minutes of sewing) and require low levels of skill (i.e.
short periods of time for sewers to achieve desired levels of productivity). In contrast, dresses and jeans have higher labor content and typically require higher degrees of sewing skill (with the time required to hitting desired productivity standards from six to eight months). Consistent with this skill content, compliance performance (as measured in all three dimensions) is lowest for T-shirts in all three dimensions than for jeans and dresses.
Similarly, theory would predict that the more elastic the demand for the product (sewing services), the more likely that firms will violate minimum wage standards. One proxy for price elasticity is pricing power-here measured as the self-reported ability of the contractor to renegotiate price if the delivery time for a product is changed by the manufacturer. Contractors who report an ability to change prices have a far lower likelihood to be in violation of minimum wage (.384 vs. .824), a far lower incidence of violations (31.1 vs. 7.2) and significantly less severity than contractors lacking this ability wage and have correspondingly lower incidence and severity levels than small contractors and those that have been in business for a relatively short period of time.
IV. The impact of contractor monitoring on compliance
A. Lean retailing and new methods of regulatory enforcement
Product market forces have been modified in recent years by a new dynamic in the channel of relations between retailers-apparel manufacturers-and textile producers. A new model of retailing--"lean retailing"--takes advantage of information technology to use real time information to reduce exposure to fickle consumer tastes (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil 1999) . Apparel suppliers, in turn, must operate with far greater levels of responsiveness and accept a great deal more risk than in the past.
"Lean retailing" takes advantage of information technologies, automation, industry standards, and management innovations to align more closely orders from suppliers with real-time sales data. This system reduces the need for retailers to stockpile large inventories of a growing range of products, thereby reducing their risks of stockouts, markdowns, and inventory carrying costs. The companies that have adopted lean retailing principles now dominate major retail segments (Abernathy et. al.1999) .
In contrast to the infrequent, large bulk shipments between apparel manufacturers and retailers under traditional retailing, lean retailers require frequent shipments made on the basis of ongoing replenishment orders placed by the retailer. These orders are made based on real-time sales information collected at the retailer's registers via bar code scanning. SKU-level sales data are then aggregated centrally and used to generate orders to suppliers, usually on a weekly basis for each store.
Retailers operating with the systems described above require frequent replenishment and demand that shipments meet standards concerning delivery times, order completeness, and accuracy. Lean retailing therefore changes the problem faced by an apparel supplier: Suppliers must replenish products within a selling season, with retailers now requiring replenishment of orders in as little as 3 days. This makes lean retailers vulnerable to disruptions to the weekly replenishment of retail orders by apparel suppliers a major problem-one that can lead to penalties, cancellation of orders, and even loss of retail customers for those suppliers. Given that retailers drive the dynamics of the apparel markets depicted in Figure 1 , the increasing importance of time translates into a potential tool of regulatory enforcement as will be discussed below.
Beginning in 1996, the WHD shifted its enforcement focus in response to these new relations in the apparel channel. Rather than regulating labor standards one contractor at a time, the WHD employed time sensitivity of lean retailers as a means of exerting regulatory pressure by invoking a long ignored provision of the FLSA, Section 15(a). Under Section 15(a) (the "hot cargo provision), WHD can embargo goods that have been manufactured in violation of the Act. Although this provision had limited impact in the traditional retail-apparel relationships where long delays in shipments and large retail inventories were an expected part of business, invocation of the hot goods provision today potentially raises the costs to retailers and their manufacturers of lost shipments and lost contracts given the short lead times of retailers. This potentially creates channel-level penalties arising from FLSA violations that quickly exceed those arising from lost back wages and civil penalties. In effect, the ability to stop the flow of goods dramatically raises the penalty faced by contractors in creating private penalties-the market based costs of failing to deliver orders in a timely manner-that increase the de facto indifference point in equation (2).
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Under the traditional regulatory calculus, the primary objective of contractorfocused enforcement effort is recovering the back pay of workers. However, in addition to ensuring that back wage claims are resolved, the WHD policy uses the threat of embargoing goods to persuade manufacturers to augment the regulatory activities of the WHD. It does so by making the release of embargoed goods contingent on the manufacturer's agreement to create a compliance program for all of its contract and subcontract shop. This entails the manufacturer agreeing to sign two types of agreement:
an agreement between the manufacturer (or jobber) and the Department of Labor; and an agreement that the manufacturer signs with its contractors (Ziff and Trattner 1999; Weil 2002 ).
The agreement between the Department of Labor and the manufacturer (a "Compliance Program Agreement") stipulates the basic components of a monitoring system that will be operated by the manufacturer.
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The provisions of this agreement include explicit top management commitment to upholding the FLSA; screening of new contractors concerning prior history of FLSA compliance; establishment of a monitoring 16 As described in a Labor Department publication for manufacturers and retailers: "The Department of Labor will not lift its objections to goods being shipped or sold until the contractor's employees have received the back wages owed them and suitable assurances of future compliance are received. Thus, it's in your best interest to ensure that your contractors comply with the FLSA. (U.S. Department of Labor 1998). 17 These agreements, however, are entered in voluntarily by the manufacturer and their terms are therefore negotiated out between the government and the manufacturer / jobber. The terms described here are taken © David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 19 system (described below); back wage guarantee and formal remediation process; and informing and training contractors regarding their responsibilities under the law.
The second set of agreements-established as a part of the overall Compliance
Program Agreement-are between the manufacturer and all of its contractors. These agreements set out the specific FLSA requirements, clearly define the terms and methods of assessing wages and overtime (the subject of some ambiguity given that much of the industry uses piece rate payment); establish specific procedures for tracking payroll records, time cards, and the use of time clocks, and lay out other administrative procedures related the contractor's compensation policies.
The agreements at both the manufacturer-and contractor-level stipulate a method of formal monitoring undertaken by the manufacturer (or its designated third-party). The model language specifies unannounced monitoring visits "…at least once every 90 days."
In the course of the visits, monitors may review contractors' payroll records and timecards; undertake piece counts (important for translating piece rate payments into hourly earnings); interview employees in private; advise contractors of compliance problems; and undertake training for contractors and / or their employees (U.S. DOL, 1998; .
18 from the Department of Labor's model agreement language specified in formal policy documents (see Wage and Hour Division, 1998 of contractors were subject to unannounced inspection visits by at least one of its manufacturing customers. The upper portion of Table 4 (column (2)) also provides the incidence of cases where a contractor was covered by one of the seven features of monitoring for all manufacturers for which it did work. For example, in 34% of cases a contractor was subject to unannounced inspections visits by all of the manufacturers for which it worked.
Table 4 also provides the distribution of monitoring features across the sample.
About 27% of the sample did not have any form of monitoring with any of their manufacturing customers while, at the other end of the spectrum, 33% of the sample had all 7 features with at least one of its manufacturing customers.
Although there are many permutations of the different monitoring activities, certain combinations of activities are associated with higher levels of monitoring activities than others. In particular, the combination of manufacturer (or their designated third party) review of contractor payroll and the ability of the manufacturer to conduct unannounced visits provide manufacturers with both the means of assessing the presence of possible minimum wage violations (payroll review) and a way of gaining a more realistic assessment of that activity (unannounced visit).
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We deem this a "highpowered" for monitoring. About 50% of the sample reports having these features in place with one or more of their manufacturers (although not necessarily both for a given contractor).
C. Effects of monitoring arrangements
If manufacturers agree to establish monitoring to avoid embargoes of goods by WHD, one would predict that contractors working for a manufacturer with a monitoring system would have better compliance performance than contractors working for a manufacturer that does not have such monitoring arrangements, all else equal. However, this predicted monitoring effect should be considered carefully. Because the agreement to monitor contractors is made between the manufacturer and the WHD, monitoring coverage is not directly determined by the contractor. A typical contractor in the sample works for between 2 and 3 manufactures at any point in time (with the maximum number in the sample being 10 manufacturers). As a result, contractors will be working with a variety of manufacturers, some requiring monitoring and some not. This means that the measured effect of monitoring on compliance cannot be regarded as simply an artifact of self-selection by contractors.
At the same time, one cannot regard the presence of monitoring as exogenous to the contractor. One would expect manufacturers that seek to thwart future embargos of its goods by entering into contractor monitoring agreements with the government will 19 We arrive at this particular combination of monitoring activities as the focus of subsequent empirical analysis through a factor analysis of the seven attributes as predictors of compliance behavior. These results are available from the author. The importance of the two attributes is also supported by discussions with WHD investigators.
© David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 22 engage in two types of behaviors: an effort to select contractors that have a higher probability of paying their workers the minimum wage; and an effort to change the behavior of contractors so that they become more compliant with minimum wage provisions. As a result, although part of the effect of monitoring at the contractor level could arise from changes in behavior of contractors who have been paired through the luck of the draw with a manufacturer that happens to have such an agreement (and therefore consistent with the monitoring effect as exogenous). But another part of the effect is that manufacturers have sought out contractors that have a higher probability of complying with the law ex ante. In the latter case, monitoring-although not chosen by the contractor-is endogenous in that the selection criteria used by the manufacturer (reduce the chance of embargoes of goods) is correlated with compliance.
Together, the two effects will lead to a predicted positive impact of monitoring on compliance outcomes. Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is impossible to directly observe whether the measured effect arises from behavior changed induced via monitoring versus sorting behavior. However, it should be noted that in the case of measuring the impact of monitoring on compliance, both effects move those firms under agreement to use increasingly contractors that comply with minimum wage standards. In this way, both effects of monitoring can be attributed to the intervention (and the desired outcome). Thus, although the effects cannot be easily unraveled, both are equally relevant to the question of whether manufacturer monitoring improves contractor behavior.
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Along with clarifying the pathways through which manufacturer monitoring affects contractor behavior, we also need to model the effects of different levels or stringency of monitoring. That is, at what point does monitoring by a subset of manufacturers actually have an impact on contractor behavior? The lower portion of Table 4 presents the incidence of monitoring at different levels of stringency. We define "weak monitoring"-the most inclusive definition of monitoring--as a case where a contractor is subject to one or more monitoring activities by one or more manufacturers (74% of the sample fits this definition). Moderate monitoring stringency ("Medium 1")
is where a contractor has manufacturers that undertake both payroll review and unannounced inspections, although those activities are not necessarily undertaken by the same manufacturer (49% of the sample fall under this categorization). A still more stringent form of monitoring ("Medium 2") occurs where the same manufacturer undertakes both payroll review and unannounced inspections, indicating that this higherpowered form of monitoring occur in a coordinated fashion by one or more manufacturer (47% of the cases). Finally, the most stringent form of monitoring ("High") is defined as the subset of cases where every manufacturer served by the contractor undertakes payroll review and unannounced visits.
The effect of monitoring can be thought of as increasing the level D in equation (2) because contractors who violate the law and are detected risk losing future business of tend to elect training, so that a cross-sectional estimate of training may reflect a combination of program effect and sorting. Because the intention of training programs is to raise wages through enhancing human capital endowments, the problem of endogeneity (and the need to find empirical strategies to separate these effects) requires redressing the problem in empirical evaluation.
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As a result, more stringent forms of monitoring imply that the expected penalty to the contractor increases, either because of the presence of high-powered monitoring features (monitoring cases "Medium 1 and 2") or the application of these features across all manufacturing customers ("High"). We therefore predict that more strenuous monitoring results in higher levels of minimum wage compliance, all else equal. Monitoring-from weak to strong--has its predicted impacts on minimum wage performance in almost every case. For example, contractors working for at least one manufacturer with at least one or more monitoring feature of any variety ("weak" monitoring) have significantly higher likelihood of compliance (.154 vs. 542) and lower incidence of violations (a difference of 16.55 per 100 workers) than those without any monitoring. Although the amount of average back wages owed to each worker each week is significantly lower in monitored than non-monitored contractors, the difference is not significantly discernable. 
V. Modeling Compliance and Performance Determinants
A. Statistical model of compliance
Given the economics of minimum wage compliance and the expected impact of monitoring, the overall likelihood, incidence, and severity of minimum wage compliance observed at contractor i can be modeled as:
Where:
MWPERF: Minimum wage performance of contractor i (likelihood, incidence, and severity)
Labor: Elasticity of labor demand and average wage level of the contractor, as characterized by the average skill level drawn upon by a contractor;
Product: Elasticity of product demand (i.e. sewing services) for the contractor, as characterized by its ability to affect the price of services it provides to manufacturers;
Monitor: Presence and stringency of monitoring by manufacturers The effects of labor and product market characteristics have been discussed above. We capture contractor features associated with labor demand elasticity by including a variable for the type of product produced by the contractor. We use three dummies to represent specific low (T-shirts) and high skill content goods (jeans and dresses), relative to an omitted category of goods that have "average" skill content. For product market, we use the response to survey questions regarding the ability of the contractor to change price in the event that a manufacturer moves up the delivery date of a product.
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We estimate separate equations for each of the four monitoring variables to capture the impact of different levels of stringency. Finally, we include variables for contractor size, age (measured as a dummy for those contractors that have been in business for more than 2 years), and a dummy for prior citations by the WHD for violations of the FLSA. However, the correlations for these characteristics are significant only in a few instances.
Finally, the correlations indicate that the presence of various forms of monitoring are negatively associated with the likelihood of non-compliance as well as with the incidence and severity of violations, and these correlations are almost all statistically significant.
B. Likelihood of non-compliance
In order to gauge the impact of monitoring on the likelihood of overall compliance (measured as the presence of no violations of minimum wage) we estimate a logit regression for each of the four types of monitoring, holding constant the other variables discussed above.
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The logit results of these regressions are presented in Table   7 .
In all four regressions, the presence of monitoring is associated with a statistically significant reduction in the probability that contractors will be in violation of minimum to adjust for any added expenses" and indicated that they renegotiate such costs "sometimes," "50/50," "frequently," "always." 23 Models of minimum wage performance for the remainder of the paper were estimated for the complete set of independent variables discussed above. However, because the variables for dress, jeans, and prior violations consistently were not statistically significant and did not change the measured effects of monitoring variables, we report regression equations that did not include these variables. The results for all regression equations including these variables are available from the author.
© David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 28 wage standards. The logit coefficient for "weak" monitoring in equation (1) The variables controlling for product and labor market characteristics included in the model also have their expected effects on compliance and are statistically significant and imply relatively large impacts on contractor behavior. In particular, a contractor's ability to renegotiate price (Mktpwr) substantially reduces the likelihood of noncompliance in all four equations by an estimate 0.44 (all else equal). In contrast producing a product with low-skill content (T-Shirt) raises the predicted level of noncompliance by 0.25 relative to producing medium-or higher-skill content goods.
C. Incidence and severity of violations: OLS and Tobit Results
As discussed above, one limitation of using non-compliance as a measure of contractor behavior is that it tells little about the incidence or severity of minimum wage violations. That is, an employer will be classified as not complying with the law whether a small or large fraction of employees are underpaid or whether a typical worker has been grossly underpaid versus receiving very slight underpayments.
To deal with this problem, we estimate the impact of monitoring and other factors on both the incidence and severity of minimum wage violations. Table 8 Columns (1) to (4) in Table 8 indicate that monitoring lowers the incidence of minimum wage violations substantially, although only the estimates for the two more stringent forms of monitoring (Medium2 and High) are statistically significant. For those cases, monitoring substantially lowers the incidence of violations by 16 per 100 workers (Medium 2) and 26 per 100 workers for those contractors who do all of their work for manufacturers with high-powered monitoring systems in place. Thus, as predicted, minimum wage performance also increases with the stringency of monitoring.
Columns (5) to (8) 
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One problem of OLS estimates of minimum wage outcomes arises because of the substantial number of contractors have not committed any violations of the minimum wage. As a result, the dependent variables (MWEMP and MWBAKPAY) are leftcensored and therefore subject to bias in estimates of the various independent variables. Table 9 corrects for this problem by estimating a series of Tobit regressions for the two types of minimum wage outcomes and four forms of monitoring.
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The Tobit results for monitoring indicate the significant effect that left censoring has on the estimated coefficients. Once we have corrected for left censoring, the estimated effects of monitoring on incidence and severity are quite large and for the most part statistically significant. For example, the estimated size of the monitoring effect is 19.6 per 100 workers for "weak" monitoring, going all the way up to an estimate effect of reducing the incidence by 55 violations per 100 workers. Similarly, the size of the monitoring effect on back pay is also substantial and significant for most definitions of monitoring.
The results imply that the association between monitoring and overall compliance (Table 7) arises from the substantial changes in the underlying conditions in contractor shops. The use of a Tobit procedures also leads to larger and more statistically 24 Although this may not seem substantial, it should be recalled that this measure is scaled by the entire work force even though minimum wage underpayments are concentrated among a subset of workers in the shop. 25 There is also a potential problem of right censoring for the incidence measure. However, very few of the observations approach the maximum of the dependent variable (i.e. 100 violations per 100 workers). As a © David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 31 significant estimated effects of product market (Mktpwr) and labor market (T-Shirt) on the two types of minimum wage performance outcomes. The estimated effect of the ability of a contractor to renegotiate price of goods is particularly striking.
D. Sorting out the effects of monitoring
As discussed above, the empirical results in Tables 7-9 must be interpreted with some caution. Although the results demonstrate a statistically significant association between monitoring and minimum wage performance, we cannot separate the extent to which those effects arise from changes that monitoring has on contractor behavior (i.e.
that they moved from non-compliance to compliance as a result of monitoring) from manufacturer decisions to find contractors that ex ante are more likely to be in compliance with standards. Since we are unable to observed "pre / post" monitoring behavior among the contractors in the sample given its cross-sectional character, separating the effects is difficult.
As argued above, since both behaviors move the median contractor towards better performance, they can both be said to arise from the presence of monitoring arrangements created by the WHD regulatory strategy. However, it may still be of policy utility to determine whether the effects of monitoring found in Tables 7-9 arise from a marketlevel sorting process where manufacturers with monitoring increasingly find and partner with a preexisting set of "good actors" versus being the result of changes in the median behavior of a set of formerly noncompliant firms. If WHD successfully increases the number of manufacturers under agreement over time, the sorting story implies that the result, Tobit measures incorporating controls for both right and left censoring do not differ from those presented in Table 9 .
© David Weil, Boston University / Harvard University Version: 04/11/03 32 good actors will find themselves with a larger and larger percentage of work in the industry (thereby leading to growth in median firm size and increases in industry concentration among contractors). On the other hand, if the predominant effect of monitoring is changing behavior of existing firms, one can imagine that the overall distribution of contractors would change little. Unfortunately, the fact that both effects are operating simultaneously precludes using a simple comparison of contractor size over time as a means of decoupling the effects.
In terms of modeling performance determinants, if contractor monitoring arises from manufacturers seeking contractors they believe to be better minimum wage performers, the monitor variable is not independent of the error term in the estimation equations underlying Table 8 and 9. In order to deal with this, we must find a variable that is correlated with monitoring but not correlated with compliance. One candidate that can be found in Table 6 in regard to the determinants of "High" monitoring is the number Given this, we estimate a two-stage least square (2SLS) regression. In the first stage, we estimate the determinants of High monitoring, where the probability of being covered by high monitoring for contractor i is:
The results of Probit estimates of equation (4) are presented in column (1) of Table 10 .
As expected, NUMANUF has a negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of high monitoring. The estimates also indicate that larger and older contractors are also more likely to be monitored, also as expected. Based on the coefficients presented in column (1), we create an estimated monitoring probability for each of the observations in the sample and use this as the instrument for monitoring.
Columns (2) through (5) in Table 10 provide OLS and Tobit estimates of the instrument for High monitoring along with other independent variables.
Comparing the results in Table 10 with those in Table 8 (OLS) and 9 (Tobit) indicate that the measured effect of monitoring on the incidence and severity of minimum wage violations is approximately of the same magnitude as that estimated where 2SLS is not employed. The estimated OLS coefficient using the direct High monitoring variable was -25.6 versus -21.4 using the 2SLS approach and the Tobit estimate of the high monitoring for was -55.1 in versus -53.1 using 2SLS. Using OLS to estimate minimum wage severity, high manufacturing was associated an average reduction in back wages owed per worker per week of $5.40 (Table 8 ) versus $8.32 using 2SLS. Using Tobit estimates, the coefficient for high monitoring is -$15.11 (Table 9) versus -$20.31 once an instrumental variable approach is incorporated.
To the extent that the 2SLS procedure holds constant the effects of matching by manufacturers, the similar values for high monitoring in the two sets of equations suggests that an important part of the total measured effect of monitoring is the change in contractor behavior elicited by the presence of monitoring. That is, once we have predicted a probability that a given contractor will be the subject of monitoring because of its underlying characteristics, the likelihood of monitoring still has about the same effect in improving performance with labor standards requirements. Although one cannot make any causal claims from this cross-sectional evidence, it offers further evidence of a robust monitoring effect.
VI. Conclusion
The literature on the economics of minimum wage going back to Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) predict that employers in certain industries will face significant incentives to violate those laws. In addition, subsequent literature (e.g. Grenier 1982; Chang and Erlich 1985; Yaniv 2001) predicts that the traditional structure of government enforcement creates insufficient regulatory incentives to overcome these behaviors because of the low expected penalties for violation and the correspondingly small probability of being detected out of compliance.
This paper provides strong empirical evidence to support the predictions of the minimum wage literature on the incentives for non-compliance in an industry like apparel that has conditions tailor-made for wide-scale non-compliance. And although the results of the study are consistent with the notion that traditional tools of regulation will not provide sufficient incentives to improve labor standards, we find very strong evidence that new forms of regulation that draw on supply chain dynamics can have a substantial impact at improving labor standards outcomes. Government, it seems, can make a difference.
Note that the use of supply chain pressure to create monitoring systems still leads to changes in contractor behavior by altering the basic regulatory calculus facing those contractors. In particular it introduces substantial private penalties that easily swamp in magnitude the civil penalties available to the government as well as appreciably increase the implicit probability of inspection (λ) facing contractors. Returning to the model of the economics of compliance implied by equation (2), if monitoring moves the median contractor from a state of non-compliance to compliance, and if one assumes the same levels of labor demand elasticity, back wages, and size, we can estimate the implicit private penalties required to change median behavior. For the median contractor described above to move to compliance, the implied penalties (D) would need to rise to over $100,000 if the probability of inspection remained the same (λ=.1).
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Using supply chain dynamics as a regulatory lever has a number of implications beyond its direct use by the WHD in the domestic apparel market. Supply chains link the U.S. retail market with international sources of apparel production, thereby providing potential analogs for those considering international labor standards regulation (Freeman 1994; Fung, O'Rourke, and Sabel 2001) . Retail restructuring and the growing 27 Alternatively, the impact of private monitoring can be thought of as equivalent to an increase in the likelihood of being detected as well as the expected penalty. In this respect, the changes necessary to induce behavior change would be equivalent to combinations of increased inspection probabilities and higher penalty levels, such as doubling the probability of inspection and raising penalties to about $46,000; tripling the probability of inspections and increasing the penalties to $23,000, etc. Understanding developments in industry supply chains in this way may provide new opportunities to use private incentives to achieve public ends. Establishing where these dynamics are occurring across different industries and harnessing them to serve public policy objectives therefore may prove a fertile means for achieving public purposes in a wide variety of regulatory arenas. Table 3 and text for definitions of different types of monitoring employed by manufacturers. An asterisk after the correlation coefficient denotes significance at the 10 percent level and a double asterisk for 5 percent.
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